North Fork Special Service District v. Robert Bennion : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2011
North Fork Special Service District v. Robert
Bennion : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kasey L. Wright; Melissa K. Mellor; Hansen, Wright, Eddy and Haws; Attorneys for Appellee.
Jeffrey T. Colemere; Brady T. Gibbs; Wrona Law Firm; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, North Fork Special Service v. Bennion, No. 20111026 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3001
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NORTH FORK SPECIAL SERVICE 
DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
ROBERT BENNION, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20111026-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE STEVEN L. HANSEN 
PRESIDING 
KASEY L.WRIGHT. 
MELISSA K. MELLOR 
Hansen, Wright, Eddy & Haws, P.C. 
233 S. Pleasant Grove Blvd., Suite 202 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801)224-2273 
Facsimile: (801)224-2457 
kwright@centralutahlaw.com 
mmellor(2>centralutahlaw.com 
JEFFREY T. COLEMERE (8527) 
BRADY T. GIBBS (11049) 
Wrona Law Firm, P.C. 
11650 South State Street, Suite 103 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Telephone: (801) 676-5252 
Facsimile: (801)676-5262 
colemere@wronalawfirm.com 
brady(&>wronalawfirm.com 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
UTAH APPELLATE CC L'STS 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
xrnRTT-f FORK SPECIAL SERVICE 
LJLO i i v l C I , 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
i »MI-R'I lU.NNION, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20111026-CA 
BRIEF* ») \PIMI 1 A \ i 
/•• PEAL FROM A H i w . > MXDLR OF :•>• MMAR'l J U I X J M E N T KJL 
,,,E FOURTH DISTRICT' COURT, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, 
STA1E OF U1A11, THE HONORABLE STEVEN L. HANSEN 
PRESIDING 
KASEYi, WKIGHT. 
MELISSA k. MELLOR 
Hansen, Wright, Eddy & Haws, P.C. 
233 S. Pleasant Grove Blvd., Suite 202 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801)224-2273 
Facsimile: (801)224-2457 
kwright@centralutahlaw.com 
mmeJlor@centralutahlaw.com 
JEll'Rl Y l.LULLMlikh^8527) 
BRADY T. GIBBS (11049) 
Wr-Hia I :iw Firm. P i 
1 Won South State Street. Suite 103 
Draper. I Hah ^ 1020 
Telephone ' • <i7o- . 2 
Facsimile:
 V M;0 O76o2o2 
colemere@wronalawfirm.com 
brady@wronalawfirm.com 
ATTORNEYS FOR A PIT: FLEE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS . i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . Hi 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY ..15 
ARGUMENT 17 
I. IN LIGHT OF APPLICABLE UTAH LAW LIMITING THE MONTHLY 
RESIDENTIAL WATER SERVICE FEES AND INTEREST CHARGABLE BY 
A SPECIAL SERVICE DISTRICT TO $200, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
DETERMINING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT MR. BENNION WAS 
LIABLE TO NFSSD FOR EXCESS WATER USAGE FEES AND INTEREST. 
17 
A. The Trial Court Erred by Not Applying the Special Service Distric Fee 
Limitations of UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-2-804 to this Case 18 
B. The Trial Court Erred By Not Limiting NFSSD's Interest Charges 
From May 5, 2008 to the Present to $200 per Month, Consistent with UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 17B-1-904 21 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MR. BENNION WAS 
RESPONSIBLE AS A MATTER OF FACT AND LAW TO MAINTAIN AND 
REPAIR THE LEAKS IN THE PROPERTY'S LATERAL WATERLINE, AND 
IN REQUIRING MR. BENNION TO PAY OVERUSE CHARGES RELATED 
TO THOSE LEAKS 23 
III. BECAUSE MR. BENNION'S DEFENSES ARE MERITORIOUS, THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO NFSSD UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-825 28 
CONCLUSION '.... 30 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A - Rules and Statutes 
ADDENDUM B - Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law On Plaintiffs Motion For 
Summary Judgment, dated October 13, 2011, Case No. 080400633, Judge Steven L. 
Hansen 
ADDENDUM C - Ruling dated September 22, 2006, Case No. 060401631, Judge 
Anthony W. Schofield 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Bd. ofEduc. Of Jordan Sch. Dist. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, 94 P.3d 234 18 
In re Olympus Constr., L.C, 2009 UT 29, 215 P.3d 129 3, 29 
Nielsonv. Sandberg, 141 P.2d696 (Utah 1943) 26 
OSI Indus, v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 860 P.2d 381(Utah App. 1993) 19 
Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985) 2, 24 
Stevens v. Bird-Jex Co., 18 P.2d 292 (Utah 1933) '. 26 
Warner v. DUG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, 20 P.3d 868 29 
Waste Mgmt. v. City of Bountiful, 2002 UT 60, 52 P.3d 1174 2, 17 
RULES 
UTAH R. APP. P. 24 24 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56 3,17 
STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-1-205 (2004) passim 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-2-1320 (2007) 3,11 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-1-904 (2007) : 3,21 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-1-904 (2011) passim 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-2-804 (2004) passim 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17D-1-106 (2011) passim 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-3-3 (2011) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102 (2009) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103 (2009) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-825 (2008) 
11 
< 
1 
1 
.passim 
IV 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NORTH FORK SPECIAL 
SERVICE DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
ROBERT BENNION, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20111026-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final order of summary' judgment of the Fourth District 
Court, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Ftonorable Steven L. Hansen presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78A-3-102(4) (2009) and. 
78A-4-103(l)(j) (2009). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court err in awarding Plaintiff summary judgment as a 
matter of law where Plaintiffs water overuse fees are limited by Utah law? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Standard of Review: A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed 
for correctness, affording no deference to the court's legal decisions. Davis County Solid 
Waste Mgmt v. City of Bountiful, 2002 UT 60, k\ 9, 52 P.3d 1174. "[A] district court's 
interpretation of a statutory provision is a question of law that [an appellate court] 
review[s] for correctness. Id. This issue was preserved in the proceedings pertaining to 
Mr. Bennion's motion to dismiss and then again in the proceedings pertaining to 
NFSSD's motion for summary judgment See R. 72-75, 246-47, 262. 
Issue No. 2: In light of Plaintiff s easement to repair the Property's lateral water 
line, did the trial court err in finding as a matter of fact and law that Mr. Bennion was 
responsible to maintain and repair the Property's leaky lateral water pipeline, and that 
Mr. Bennion was liable to pay overuse charges related to those leaks? 
Standard of Review: "To mount a successful attack on the trial court's findings 
of fact, an appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings 
and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, 
the evidence is insufficient to support the findings." Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). This issue was preserved in Mr. Bennion's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. See R. 241-42; 254-56. 
Issue No. 3: Given that Mr. Bennion's defenses are meritorious, did the trial 
court err in awarding Plaintiff its attorney's fees pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-
825? 
2 
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Standard of Review: "With regard to the award of attorney fees, whether a claim 
is 'without merit' is a question of law [an appellate court] review[s] for correctness." In 
re Olympus Constr., L.C., 2009 UT 29, Tj 8, 215 P.3d 129. This issue was preserved in 
Mr. Bennion's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
See R. 241-42,250-51. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are reproduced in Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-1-205 (2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-2-1320 (2007); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-1-904 (2007) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-1-904 (2011) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-2-804 (2004) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17D-1-106 (2011) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-825 (2008); and 
UTAH R. Civ. P. 56(c) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 29, 2008, Plaintiff North Fork Special Service District filed a 
Complaint against Defendant Robert Bennion, in the Fourth Judicial District Court, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Steven L. Hansen presiding. R. 1-6. Mr. Bennion filed his 
Answer to the Complaint on May 21, 2008. R. 10-20. On May 27, 2008, Mr. Bennion 
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, which motion was also later briefed to the court 
through court-ordered supplemental briefing. R. 21-27, 58, 151-55. Defendant's motion 
to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. R. 58, 151-55. Plaintiff filed a motion 
for summary judgment on May 19, 2010, which motion was heard by the trial court on 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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June 8, 2011. R. 170-209, 445. On October 13, 2011, the trial court entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and an 
order granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. R. 406-13, 422-25. Mr. Bennion 
timely filed a notice of appeal with the trial court on November 10, 2011. R. 440-41. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1998, Defendant Robert Bennion permanently shut off water to his mountain 
home. R. 77. In 2006 Plaintiff North Fork Special Service District ("NFSSD") was 
awarded a temporary easement for the purpose of repairing and replacing Mr. Bennion5 s 
leaky lateral waterline. R. 102-05, 224-28. Despite those facts, NFSSD recently 
obtained a judgment against Mr. Bennion primarily for water overuse fees and interest 
pertaining to leaks in Mr. Bennion's lateral waterline for the period of February 28, 2004 
through March 31, 2009, in the amount of $171,559.10. See R. 406-13. 
* sfc * 
NFSSD was organized on October 7, 1977 by resolution of the Utah County 
Commission. R. 5, 208, 261, 412. NFSSD provides water, sanitation, and fire protection 
services to properties located within its boundaries. R. 5, 206, 261, 412. From 
approximately 1993 to March 31, 2009, Mr. Bemiion owned mountain property including 
a residence located at 9403 Canopy Lane, in Utah County, State of Utah (the "Property"). 
R. 5-6, 19, 208, 206, 259, 412. The Property is located within the boundaries of NFSSD. 
R. 5, 19,208,259,412. 
4 
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Factual Background1 
Prior to Mr. Bennion's ownership of the Property, during the 1980s developer C. 
Robert Redford contracted with Utah County to develop a recreational resort with 
property he owned in the North Fork of Provo Canyon. R. 80. As part of that 
development agreement Redford promised Utah County that he would construct at his 
own expense, a compliant culinary water system. Id. Once built, the homeowners' 
association would assume responsibility for maintenance of the water system. Id. 
Redford posted a bond for the water improvements, but then failed to construct the 
culinary water system. Id. Utah County elected not to collect on the bond. Id. Mr. 
Bennion's Property is located just outside of the Redford development. R. 79. 
During that same period of time, the previous owner of Mr. Bennion's Property 
permitted an adjacent landowner named Bebert, to temporarily connect to the Property's 
water system. R. 80. The plan was to permit Bebert to draw water from the Property's 
system until he could construct a permanent water system on his own land the next 
spring. Id. Because at this time NFSSD owned enough water shares sufficient to meet 
the needs of its users and because there were sufficient tax revenues to cover the costs of 
maintenance and upkeep of NFSSD's water system, there were no water meters on the 
Property. R. 79-80. 
1
 The information contained in the factual background cited in this brief primarily 
comes from facts provided to the trial court by Mr. Bennion in his Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, which facts were not 
objected to or disputed by NFSSD in its opposing memorandum. See R. 76-80, 101-32. 
5 
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In or around 1993, when Mr. Bennion owned the Property, Dr. Pamela Vincent 
purchased land in Redford's development. R. 79. Because Redford had failed to 
construct the agreed-upon culinary system for his development, Vincent had no source of 
water. Id. For that reason, Vincent was granted a conditional building permit. Id. Upon 
completion of construction of her home, and with the advice and consent of agents of 
NFSSD, Vincent hired a contractor to tap into the temporary water line running from Mr. 
Bennion's waterline into the Bebert property. Id. Vincent's connection to Mr. Bennion's 
waterline was made without a permit, was not to code, and was never properly inspected 
for compliance with current law. Id. 
Additionally, at or around this period of time, NFSSD claimed that the tax 
revenues it received no longer covered its expenses, and thus began charging property 
owners for water and other services. Id. Consistent with that intent, NFSSD installed 
water meters at Vincent's home and at the juncture between Mr. Bennion's pipeline and 
the main line. Id. Vincent was billed for the water passing through her meter, and Mr. 
Bennion was billed for the balance of the water passing through the meter at the main line 
juncture. Id. Because NFSSD could not determine how much wrater the Bebert home 
used, NFSSD either charged Bebert nothing or charged only a minimum access charge. 
Id. 
In the winter of 1998, Mr. Bennion's pipeline on the Property began to develop 
serious leaks. R. 78. NFSSD advised Mr. Bennion that it was his duty to repair the 
pipeline. Id. To stop the loss of water, Mr. Bennion shut off the water where his pipeline 
6 
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connected into the main water line. Id. Because Vincent had tapped into the Bebert 
extension to Mr. Bennion's private pipeline, Mr. Bennion's act of shutting off his water 
also terminated water service to Vincent's home. Id. 
Without any water, Vincent filed suit against Mr. Bennion in the Fourth District 
Court for the State of Utah, Case No. 980405600. Id. Among other claims, Vincent 
sought an injunction barring Mr. Bennion from turning off his water. Id. Mr. Bennion 
counterclaimed for an injunction ordering Vincent to cease using his private waterline. 
Id. He also joined NFSSD as a third party defendant and sought an injunction ordering 
NFSSD to cease using his personally owned waterline to deliver water to NFSSD's other 
customers. Id. On September 21, 1998, the court awarded Vincent a temporary 
restraining order enjoining Mr. Bennion from shutting off his water during the pendency 
of the action. Id. However, because Mr. Bennion lacked sufficient funds to continue the 
litigation, his counsel withdrew leaving Mr. Bennion to represent himself. R. 77-78. Mr. 
Bennion did not timely respond to requests for discovery, and as a result, the court struck 
Mr. Bennion's pleadings and dismissed Mr. Bennion's counterclaim with prejudice. R. 
77. 
In 1998 Mr. Bennion stopped using his Property. Id. Additionally, in 1998 Mr. 
Bennion shut off the valve where the water enters his home, and has not used any water 
to the Property since that time. Id. Mr. Bennion repeatedly notified NFSSD that he does 
not wish to receive water service. Id. 
7 
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On March 29, 2002, NFSSD sued Mr. Bennion in the Fourth District Court for the 
State of Utah, Case No. 020100735, claiming $16,000.00 in past due charges for services 
rendered. Id. This case number was later changed to Case No. 040401235. Id. Of the 
damages sought by NFSSD, $11,000.00 was demanded for excess water that had 
allegedly leaked from Mr. Bermion's waterline during the winter of 1997-98. Id. The 
remaining balance was for access charges (i.e. base fees for having access to water 
services), fire protection, trash removal services, and interest and finance charges. Id. 
Although Mr. Bennion counterclaimed for damages, his counterclaim was dismissed for 
failure to file a notice of claim. R. 77, 114-15; 110-12. The court also held that Mr. 
Bennion could have brought this claim for damages in the Vincent v. Bennion case, but 
did not do so, and was therefore barred by res judicata from bringing those claims in Case 
No. 040401235. Id. As a result, on January 24, 2006, NFSSD in addition to the 
$11,000.00 for excess water fees, NFSSD was awarded $3,524.31 for base user fees for 
the period of January 1, 1997 through January 25, 2002. R. 76-77. 
On May 25, 2006, NFSSD again sued Bennion in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, Case No. 060401631. R. 76, 105. This time NFSSD sought to condemn an 
easement across Mr. Bennion's Property for the purpose of constructing a waterline into 
Redford's development to service NFSSD's customers including Vincent. Id. Mr. 
Bennion again counterclaimed, seeking an injunction barring NFSSD from using public 
monies to condemn an easement to benefit a private developer. Id. Mr. Bennion also 
sought an injunction barring NFSSD from using his water pipeline without his consent or 
8 
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authorization. Id. NFSSD then filed a motion for immediate occupancy of the Property. 
Id. 
In response to NFSSD's motion, Judge Anthony Schofield issued a Ruling dated 
September 22, 2006 (the "September 22, 2006 Ruling"). R. 105. In its ruling, the court 
found that the waterline that crosses the Property is leaking and losing hundreds of 
gallons of water each week. R. 102-05, 224-28. Further, the court noted NFSSD's 
representations that it was not planning to repair the existing pipe, but rather that it 
planned to install a new waterline. R. 103, 226. However, NFSSD also represented that 
a new waterline could not be installed before winter and would require that NFSSD 
immediately make emergency repairs to Mr. Bennion's waterline. Id. Acting under the 
belief that the granting of NFSSD's request for immediate occupancy would be the best 
way to halt additional water loss, the court granted NFSSD the right to immediate 
occupancy of Mr. Bennion's Property through which Mr. Bennion's waterline travels. R. 
102-03, 225-26. Further, the court granted NFSSD temporary ownership of the waterline 
during the pendency of the condemnation case—stating that whether NFSSD begins 
construction immediately or simply uses the Order of Immediate Occupancy to begin 
preliminary work on the Property is within NFSSD's discretion. R. 76, 103, 226. 
The Instant Case 
On February 29, 2008, NFSSD filed a complaint against Mr. Bennion in the 
instant case, alleging a failure to pay special service district fees for the period of January 
26, 2002 to the present, unjust enrichment and $250,000.00 in punitive damages. R. 1-6. 
9 
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After answering the Complaint, Mr. Bennion filed a motion to dismiss arguing that 
absent a tort claim NFSSD was not entitled to punitive damages, and that NFSSD's 
claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. R. 21-27. NFSSD opposed Mr. 
Bennion's motion to dismiss and a hearing was held on August 25, 2008. R. 33-40, 58. 
At the hearing, the trial court dismissed NFSSD's claim for punitive damages and 
ordered the parties to provide supplemental briefing as to the applicability of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 17B-1-904, which limits the amount a local district can collect from a residential 
customer for past due service fees to $200 per month. R. 58, 81. The trial court: also 
ruled that a four year statute of limitations ctpplies to the instant case. See R. 132. 
On September 2, 2008, Mr. Bennion filed his supplemental memorandum in 
support of his motion to dismiss with the trial court. R. 62-81. In his supplemental 
pleading, Mr. Bennion argued that because the Property is residential, NFSSD's service 
fees, collection costs, interest, court costs, reasonable attorney's fees and damages may 
not exceed $200 per month as prescribed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-1-904, which was 
enacted by the Utah State Legislature on May 3, 2004. R. 75. Additionally, Mr. Bennion 
argued the retroactive applicability of UTAH CODE ANN. § 17D-1-106, which makes the 
provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-1-904 applicable to special service districts such 
as NFSSD, and which was enacted on May 5, 2008. See R. 72-74. 
In response, NFSSD claimed that the Utah State Legislature did not make Section 
17B-1-904 applicable to special service districts until May 5, 2008 as per the language of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17D-1-106, which designation occurred shortly after this case was 
10 
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filed on February 29, 2008. R. 131. Further, NFSSD asserted that pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 63-3-3, statutes are not to be applied retroactively, unless expressly so 
declared by the Legislature. Id. As exhibits to its opposition memorandum, NFSSD 
provided the trial court with various pleadings from the previous cases cited above, 
including Judge Schofield's September 22, 2006 Ruling. See R. 102-21. 
In reply to NFSSD's opposition memorandum, Mr. Bennion provided the trial 
court with the legislative history surrounding Sections 17B-1-904 and 17D-1-106. R. 
140-43. In particular, Mr. Bennion informed the court that UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-2-
205 (enacted on May 3, 2004) was the predecessor of Section 17D-1-106, and contained 
express language noting that special service districts were bound by the $200 monthly fee 
limitation prescribed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-2-804, which was the predecessor 
statute to Section 17B-1-904. Id. Additionally, because the predecessor Sections (i.e. 
Sections 17A-2-205 and 17B-2-804) were in effect from May 3, 2004 to April 30, 2007, 
Mr. Bennion asked the court to, at a minimum, limit NFSSD's fees to $200 per month 
during that period of time. Id. 
With the parties' supplemental briefs before it, the trial court issued a Decision on 
September 25, 2008. R. 151-55. The court determined that UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-1-
904 does not apply to limit NFSSD's damages to $200. R. 154. In rendering that 
decision, the trial court essentially adopted NFSSD's position as stated in its 
supplemental opposition brief. SeeR. 152-55. Further, the court found that UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 17A-2-1320, which was repealed May 5, 2008, and which authorized a special 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
service districts to pass a resolution or ordinance imposing fees of charges for services 
provided by the district, was applicable to this case. R. 152-53. The court denied Mr. 
Bennion's motion to dismiss, but did not rule on whether Sections 17A-2-205 and 17B-2-
804 limited NFSSD's fees to $200 during the period of May 3, 2004 to April 30, 2007. 
SeeR. 151-55. 
On May 17, 2010, after a long period of inactivity in the case, NFSSD filed a 
motion for summary judgment, claiming that there are no material facts in dispute and 
that NFSSD is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. R. 167-209. In arguing its motion 
for summary judgment, NFSSD claimed that Mr. Bennion did not pay and is liable for 
$3, 711.00 in base user fees for water, fire protection and sanitation services provided by 
NFSSD to the Property for the five-year period of February 28, 2004 through March 31, 
2009. R. 200-01. Additionally, NFSSD claimed Mr. Bennion did not pay and is also 
liable for water overuse of greater than 5,000 gallons per month from February 28, 2004 
through March 31, 2009, at an amount of $95,330.38, plus interest at the rate of 12% per 
annum. R. 199-200. At the time of its motion, the interest sought by NFSSD totaled 
$47,968.42 for the period of April 30, 2004 through May 14, 2010. R. 197. 
In addition to those arguments, in his motion for summary judgment NFSSD also 
claimed that given Mr. Bennion's alleged bad faith actions in this and in prior cases, 
NFSSD was entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78B-5-825. R. 198. In support of that argument, NFSSD claimed that it notified 
Mr. Bennion of his obligation to pay user fees and yet was forced to pursue litigation for 
12 
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over eight years in an attempt to obtain those fees and for the purpose of obtaining 
injunctive relief over threats made by Mr. Bennion. Id. NFSSD further alleged that 
because it had been awarded judgment against Mr. Bennion for its fees for the period of 
November 1997 through May 1, 1998 in a prior case (Case No. 040401235), that Mr. 
Bennion's defense of the instant case constituted bad faith. R. 177-82, 198. 
As an exhibit to its motion for summary judgment, NFSSD submitted statements 
of its charges as invoiced to Mr. Bennion for the period of February 28, 2004 through 
March 31, 2009. R. 173-75. Additionally, NFSSD submitted the declarations of Rasheli 
Anderson, the District Clerk for NFSSD, and of David Boshard, the Director of Services 
of NFSSD. R. 185-95. Those declarations each contain the following chart, which 
illustrated the particular periods of time and amounts for which water overuse fees were 
assessed by NFSSD to the Property: 
Dates Covered Gallons Excessive Use Charge 
Feb. 2004 — A p r . 2004 
May 2004 — Oct. 2004 
Oct. 2004 — A p r . 2005 
May 2005 — Oct. 2005 
Oct. 2005 — Apr. 2006 
May 2006 — Oct. 2006 
Oct. 2006 — Apr. 2007 
May 2007 — Oct. 2007 
Interpolation of total 
450,000 
610,000 
938,568 
3,167,900 
2,433,500 
3,655,600 
2,419,700 
$ 628.00 
$ 1,614.50 
$ 3,000.00 
$6,271.06 
$23,858.18 
$18,230.00 
$27,512.32 
$14,215.82 
R. 186, 192. 
In response to NFSSD's motion for summary judgment, Mr. Bennion disputed that 
his participation in prior litigation initiated by NFSSD constituted bad faith sufficient to 
award NFSSD attorney fees under Section 78B-5-825. R. 249-50. Mr. Bennion also 
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argued that summary judgment was improper as a matter of law because UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 17B-2-804 and 17A-1-205 apply to this case. R. 246-47. Mr. Bennion 
explained to the court that Section 17B-2-804, which was enacted by the Utah Legislature 
on May 3, 2004, limits the service fees and interest that a local district can charge a 
residential customer to $200 per month, was the law of this State from May 3, 2004 until 
April 30, 2007. Id. Furthermore, Mr. Bennion argued that Section 17A-1-205, made the 
limitations of Section 17B-2-804 applicable to special service districts including NFSSD. 
Id. Lastly, as an exhibit to his opposition memorandum Mr. Bennion provided Judge 
Schofield's September 26, 2006 Ruling, granting NFSSD an easement of immediate 
access to repair and/or replace Mr. Bennion's leaking lateral water pipeline. R. 225-28 
After a hearing on NFSSD's motion for summary judgment on June 8, 2011, the 
trial Court granted NFSSD's motion for summary judgment. R. 445:25-26. 
Additionally, upon a motion from NFSSD, the court struck Mr. Bennion's statutory 
arguments as redundant. See R. 445:25. On October 13, 2011, the trial court issued its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. 406-13. The court concluded that Mr. 
Bennion is the owner of the lateral waterline found on his Property, and that Mr. Bennion 
is responsible for the maintenance of that waterline. R. 409. Further, the court ruled that 
for the four-year period of February 28, 2004 through March 31, 2009, Mr. Bemiion owes 
NFSSD $3,711.00 in base user fees, $95,330.38 for excess water usage fees, $61,155.22 
in interest at the rate of 12% per annum for the period of April 30, 2004 through June 8, 
2011, and $11,362.50 in attorney's fees pursuant to Section 78B-5-825. R. 408-09. The 
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court also ruled that NFSSD was entitled to continuing interest at the rate of 12% per 
annum. R. 408. NFSSD's judgment amount totals $171,559.10. R.422-25. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
POINT I: On summary judgment the trial court awarded NFSSD $156,485.60 in 
total service fees and interest for a four-year period of time from February 28, 2004 
through March 31, 2009. In rendering that decision, the trial court overlooked binding 
Utah law, which serves to limit NFSSD's service and interest fees chargeable to Mr. 
Bennion to a maximum amount of $200 per month for the applicable periods of time. As 
a general rule, a party is entitled to have its rights determined on the basis of the law as it 
existed at the time of the occurrence. Accordingly, for the three-year period from May 3, 
2004 through April 30, 2007 in which UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 17B-2-804 and 17A-1-205 
were in effect, NFSSD's service fees of $80,486.56 as well as 12% in interest charges for 
that period should be reduced to a maximum of $7,200.00 ($200 multiplied by 36 
months). Additionally, in light of NFSSD's current $200 monthly limitations on interest 
charges as prescribed by UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 17B-1-904 and 17D-1-106, the trial court 
erred in awarding NFSSD interest in excess of that amount for the period of May 8, 2008 
to the present. May 8, 2008 was the date that Section 17B-l-904's interest fee limitations 
became binding upon NFSSD. Given the trial court's failure to apply binding Utah law, 
NFSSD's grant of summary judgment should be reversed. 
POINT II: Also on summary judgment, the trial court determined that Mr. 
Bennion was responsible to maintain the lateral waterline on his Property, and that he 
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was liable to pay NFSSD $41,728.14 plus interest for the water that leaked from the 
Property's lateral waterline from September 26, 2006 through October 2007. The court 
rendered this decision while holding in its hand Judge Anthony Schofield's prior 
September 26, 2006 Ruling, in which he granted NFSSD an immediate occupancy 
easement for the purpose conducting emergency repairs to the profusely leaking 
waterline. Additionally, the trial court overlooked longstanding Utah precedent requiring 
an easement holder, such as NFSSD, to maintain its easement regardless of the servient 
landowner's use of that easement. Where the facts and the law demonstrate that it was 
Si 
NFSSD, and not Mr. Bennion, that was responsible for repairing the Property's leaky 
waterline, and that NFSSD failed to timely make those repairs, the trial court erred in 
assessing liability to Mr. Bennion for the water overuse charges awarded to NFSSD from 
September 26, 2006 through October 2007. 
POINT III: At hearing on NFSSD's motion for summary judgment, the trial 
court found that Mr. Bennion's defenses were asserted in bad faith and granted NFSSD's 
demand for attorney's fees of $11,362.50 pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-825. In 
rendering that decision, however, the court overlooked the requirement that Mr. 
Bennion's claims be without merit. As is demonstrated by Points I and II, Mr. Bennion's 
claims have merit and NFSSD is therefore not entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
pursuant to Section 78B-5-825. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN LIGHT OF APPLICABLE UTAH LAW LIMITING THE 
MONTHLY RESIDENTIAL WATER SERVICE FEES AND 
INTEREST CHARGABLE BY A SPECIAL SERVICE DISTRICT TO 
$200, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THAT MR. BENNION WAS LIABLE TO NFSSD 
FOR EXCESS WATER USAGE FEES AND INTEREST. 
In both his motion to dismiss and again in his opposition to NFSSD's motion for 
summary judgment, Mr. Bennion asked the trial court to consider several applicable 
statutes prescribing a $200 limit on monthly water service fees and interest that NFSSD 
was permitted to charge to its residential customers. Irrespective of that request, the trial 
court deemed those statutes inapplicable and awarded NFSSD summary judgment for 
service fees and interest in the amount of $156,485.60, for the four year period of 
February 28, 2004 through March 31, 2009. The trial court incorrectly interpreted the 
application of those statutes to this case. 
Summary judgment is warranted only when there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. UTAH R. CIV. P. 
56(c). "In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, [an appellate court] give[s] the 
court's legal decisions no deference, reviewing for correctness." Davis County Solid 
Waste Mgrnt, 2002 UT 60, ^ 9. "Specifically, a district court's interpretation of a 
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statutory provision is a question of law that [an appellate court] review[s] for 
correctness." Id. 
"When faced with a question of statutory interpretation, [an appellate court's] 
primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature." State v. 
Parduhn, 2011 UT 57, f^ 21, 266 P.3d 765 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Bd ofEdiic. Of Jordan Sch. Dist v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, \ 8, 94 P.3d 234. 
(The Utah Supreme Court's "aim in construing a statute is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve."). "To 
discern legislative intent, [an appellate court] first looks to the plain language of the 
statute." Parduhn, 2011 UT 57, f 21. "As part of [its] plain language analysis, [an 
appellate court] read[s] the language of the statute as a whole and also in its relation to 
other statutes." Id.; see also Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, f 17, 66 P.3d 592 (An 
appellate court "read[s] the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interprets] its 
provision in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters."). . 
A. The Trial Court Erred by Not Applying the Special Service District Fee 
Limitations of UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-2-804 to this Case. 
One of the applicable and binding statutes that was in effect during the period of 
this case (i.e. February 28, 2004 through March 31, 2009), is UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-2-
804, which was enacted on May 3, 2004. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-2-804 (2004). 
The clear legislative intent of Section 17B-2-804 is to limit the amount of past due 
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service fees and interest that can be charged to a service district's residential customer. 
Section 17B-2-804 states in relevant part: 
(3) (a) A local district may file a civil action against the customer if the 
customer fails to pay the past due service fees and collection costs within 
30 calendar days from the date on which the local district mailed notice 
under Subsection (l)(b). 
(b) (i) In a civil action under this Subsection (3), a customer is liable to the 
local district for an amount that: 
(A) consists of past due service fees, collection costs, interest, court costs, a 
reasonable attorney's fee, and damages; and 
(B) if the customer's property is residential, may not exceed $200. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b)(i), a court may, upon a finding of 
good cause, waive interest, court costs, the attorney's fee, and damages, or 
any combination of them. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-2-804(3)(a) (2004) (emphasis added). Admittedly, section 17B-
2-804 was repealed on April 30, 2007. See id. However, this Court has previously 
declared that "[a]s a general rule, a party is entitled to have its rights determined on the 
basis of the law as it existed at the time of the occurrence[.]" OSI Indus, v. Utah State 
Tax Comm% 860 P.2d 381, 383 (Utah App. 1993). Accordingly, from the date it was 
enacted on May 3, 2004, until the date it was repealed on April 30, 2007, Section 17B-2-
804(3)(a)and its $200 service fee and interest limitation is effective as to this case. 
The applicability of Section 17B-2-804 is not hindered by the fact that its plain 
language states that it applies to "local districts," as opposed to "special districts" like 
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NFSSD. In addition to enacting Section 17B-2-804, on May 3, 2004 the Utah Legislature 
also enacted UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-1-205 (2004), which states: 
Each special district under this title is subject to the provisions of Title 17B, 
Chapter2, Part 8, Collection of Water and Sewer Service Fees, to the same 
extent as if the special district were a local district under Title 17B? Chapter 
2, Local Districts. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-1-205 (2004). A plain language reading of Section 17A-1-205 
together with Section 17B-2-804 reveals that during the time of Section 17B-2-804's 
three-year life in the Code of the State of Utah, the Utah Legislature intended that special 
districts such as NFSSD comply with Section 17B-2-804's provisions. See Pardnhn, 
2011 UT 57,1(21. 
In particular, From May 3, 2004 through April 30, 2007, NFSSD was prohibited 
by Section 17B-2-804 from charging Mr. Bennion, a residential customer, more than 
$200 per month for past due water service fees and interest. Thus, the maximum amount 
of service fees and interest that NFSSD should have been entitled to for that three-year 
span was $7,200 ($200 multiplied by 36 months). Significantly, however, for that same 
three-year period of time (i.e. May 3, 2004 through April 30, 2007), on summary 
judgment the trial court found that NFSSD was entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
and awarded NFSSD approximately $80,486.56 in water service fees as well as 12% in 
interest charges. SeeR. 186. Upon receipt of judgment, NFSSD calculated its total 
interest (including that three-year period) as amounting to $61,155.22. Given the trial 
court's failure to correctly interpret and apply Section 17B-2-804, this case should be 
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reversed and remanded to the trial court for re-adjustment of the past due service fees 
awarded to NFSSD for the period of May 3, 2004 through April 30,2007, consistent with 
the limitations prescribed by Section 17B-2-804. 
B. The Trial Court Erred By Not Limiting NFSSD's Interest Charges From 
May 5, 2008 to the Present to $200 per Month, Consistent with UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 17B-1-904. 
In rendering summary judgment in favor of NFSSD, the trial court failed to apply 
the $200 monthly interest limitation as prescribed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-1-904, to 
the 12% interest on unpaid base user fees and water overuse fees awarded to NFSSD for 
the period of May 8, 2008 to the present. A brief examination of the historical 
background of Section 17B-1-904 reveals the trial court's error. 
On April 30, 2007, the date that Section 17B-2-804 was repealed, the Utah 
Legislature enacted UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-1-904, which contains the same language 
from subsections (2) through (7) of Section 17B-2-804 including the $200 limitation on 
fees and interest as cited above. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-2-804 (2004) with 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-1-904 (2007). Section 17B-1-904 is still the law today.2 See 
2
 In relevant part Section 17B-1-904 states: 
(5) (a) A local district may file a civil action against the customer if the 
customer fails to pay the past due service fees and collection costs within 
30 calendar days from the date on which the local district mailed notice 
under Subsection (2)(b). 
(b) (i) In a civil action under this Subsection (5), a customer is liable to the 
local district for an amount that: 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-1-904 (2011). Like its predecessor statute (Section 17B-2-804), 
Section 17B-1-904 expressly applies to "local districts." Id. 4 
On April 30, 2007, after having repealed Section 17A-1-205, which expressly 
makes the fee limitations of Section 17B-2-804 applicable to special service districts such 
I 
as NFSSD, the Utah Legislature did not enact another similar statute. Realizing its 
mistake, a year later on May 5, 2008, the Legislature enacted UTAH CODE ANN. § 17D-1-
106. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 17D-1-106 (2011). In no uncertain language, Section 17D- i 
1-106 states that "[a] special service district is, to the same extent as if it were a local 
district, subject to and governed by . . . (g) Title 17B, Chapter 1, Part 9, Collection of 
Service Fees and Charges." Id. This change evinced the Utah Legislature's clear intent 
that the $200 fee and interest limitation provisions of Section 17B-1-904 apply to interest 
charged by a special service district to its residential customer. 
Here, the trial court awarded NFSSD 12% per annum interest in the amount of 
$61,155.22. That interest was accruing for the period of April 30, 2004 through June 8,
 — 
2011, on the trial court's award to NFSSD of $99,041.38, which includes base user fees 
of $3,711.00 and excess water fees of $95,330.38. Additionally, the trial court awarded 
• 
(A) consists of past due service fees, collection costs, interest, court costs, a 
reasonable attorney's fee, and damages; and 
(B) if the customer's property is residential, may not exceed $200. f 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(b)(i), a court may, upon a finding of 
good cause, waive interest, court costs, the attorney fee, and damages, or 
any combination of them.. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-l-904(5) (2011) (emphasis added). 
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NFSSD continuing 12% interest on the total judgment amount until it is paid in full. The 
trial court's award of interest from the period of May 5, 2008, when Section 17D-1-106 
was enacted, to the present was clearly in error. Pursuant to the limitations prescribed by 
Section 17B-1-904, the most that NFSSD could collect in interest for that period of time 
is $200 per month. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 17D-1-106 (2011) and 17B-1-904 (2011). 
Because of that error of law, the trial court's summary judgment should be reversed and a 
remand issued for re-adjustment of the interest awarded to NFSSD for the period of May 
5, 2008 to the present, consistent with the limitations prescribed by Section 17B-1-904. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MR. BENNION 
WAS RESPONSIBLE AS A MATTER OF FACT AND LAW TO 
MAINTAIN AND REPAIR THE LEAKS IN THE PROPERTY'S 
LATERAL WATERLINE, AND IN REQUIRING MR. BENNION TO 
PAY OVERUSE CHARGES RELATED TO THOSE LEAKS. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law granting NFSSD's motion for 
summary judgment, the trial court found that Mr. Bennion, and not NFSSD, was 
responsible for the maintenance of the Property's lateral waterline. However, the 
evidence provided to the trial court and Utah law clearly demonstrates that NFSSD was 
responsible for that maintenance pursuant to an easement that NFSSD obtained on 
September 26, 2006. Accordingly, the trial court erred assigning to Mr. Bennion the 
cost/duty of maintenance for the Property's lateral waterline, and also erred in awarding 
NFSSD more than $41,728.14 in damages related to water overuse charges resulting from 
the lack of maintenance for that line. 
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An appellant challenging the sufficiency of the trial court's findings of fact has a 
duty to first marshal all of the record evidence in support of the court's findings. UTAH 
R. APP. P. 24(a)(9). Next, an appellant must "demonstrate that even viewing it in the 
light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings." Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
The relevant evidence presented to the trial court in the instant case is as follows: 
• At all times relevant to this action, Mr. Bennion owned the Property, which is 
located within the Boundaries of NFSSD (R. 412); 
• For the period of February 29, 2004 through March 31, 2009, NFSSD 
continuously provided the Property with water services (R. 411 -12); 
• NFSSD is responsible for the maintenance of the main waterlines of its water 
delivery system (R. 411); 
• Typically, NFSSD is not responsible for maintenance of lateral waterlines that 
connect to the main waterlines of NFSSD's water delivery system (id.); 
• Generally, individual property owners are responsible for the maintenance of 
lateral waterlines servicing their properties (id.); 
• Prior to November 1997 through March 31, 2009, Mr. Bennion was the owner 
of the lateral waterline from the point it connects to NFSSD's main waterline 
at a meter box located north of the Property to the meter box south of the 
Property, which southerly meter box is located on a property adjacent to the 
Property (R. 410-11); 
• In 1998, Mr. Bennion shut off the water valve to his Property and did not use 
water at his Property from that time on (R. 77); 
• In the past, Mr. Bennion refused to allow NFSSD's representatives onto the 
Property to fix and service the Property's lateral waterline, but that incident 
occurred well before the time period at issue in this case (R. 253-54, 410); 
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• The leaks that may have contributed to the excess water usage through the 
Property's lateral waterline were remedied after NFSSD obtained an easement 
to enter into the Property for the purpose of fixing and replacing the lateral 
waterline (R. 102-05, 225-28, 410); 
• On September 26, 2006, NFSSD obtained an easement for immediate 
occupancy from Judge Anthony Schofield in Case No. 060401631, which 
easement was granted for the purpose of permitting NFSSD to stop and repair 
excessive water leaks in the Property's lateral waterline (R. 225-28); 
• In his Ruling, Judge Schofield found that the lateral waterline that crosses the 
Property is leaking and losing hundreds of gallons of water each week (R. 
228); 
• Further, Judge Schofield noted NFSSD's representations that it was not 
planning to repair the existing waterline, but rather that it planned to install a 
new waterline, and that a new waterline could not be installed before winter 
and would require that NFSSD immediately make emergency repairs to Mr. 
Bennion's lateral waterline (R. 226); 
• Acting under the belief that the granting of NFSSD's request for an easement 
would be the best way to halt additional water loss, Judge Schofield granted 
NFSSD the right to immediate occupancy of Mr. Bennion's Property through 
which Mr. Bennion's waterline travels (R. 224-25); 
• Judge Schofield held that whether NFSSD begins construction for replacement 
of the waterline immediately or simply uses the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy to begin preliminary repair work on the existing lateral waterline is 
within NFSSD's discretion (R. 226); 
• NFSSD's invoices demonstrate that that its repairs to Mr. Bennion's lateral 
waterline occurred in October 2007, the last date that NFSSD charged Mr. 
Bennion for water overuse fees {See R. 173-75); and 
• Mr. Bennion continued to be charged water overuse fees from September 26, 
2006, the date that NFSSD was granted an easement to repair or replace the 
Property's leaking lateral waterline, through March 31, 2009, which amount 
approximately totals $41,728.14 ($27,512.32 charge for water used over base 
amount from October 2006 to April 2007 plus $14,215.82 charge for water 
used over base amount from May to October 2007), exclusive of interest 
charges {See id). 
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The law in Utah with respect to maintenance obligations on easements between 
dominant (the easement grantee) and servient (the easement grantor) estates is established 
by long-standing precedent. In Stevens v. Bird-Jex Co., 18 P.2d 292 (Utah 1933), the 
court discussed the relative obligations of the dominant and servient estates as follows: 
The general rule governing the respective rights of the owners of the 
dominant and the servient estates is stated in 19 C.J. 977, § 877, as follows: 
The owner of the servient estate may use his property in any 
manner and for any purpose consistent with the enjoyment of 
the easement, and the owner of the dominant estate cannot 
interfere with this use." 
He may himself use the way, or permit others to do so, subject to the 
limitation that his use or the use of his permittee must not be such as to 
impair the enjoyment of the easement by the owner of the dominant estate, 
or subject him to extra expense in keeping it in repair, and it is not 
necessary that he expressly reserve any such right. 
Stevens, 18P.2dat295. ." .. • 
Additionally, the longstanding case of Nielsvn v. Sandberg, 141 P.2d 696 (Utah 
1943), dictates that NFSSD is required to maintain its easement regardless of the use or 
nonuse of the Property by Mr. Bennion. In Nielson, the Utah Supreme Court declared 
that "[t]he owner of such an easement over lands of another is required 'to keep up, 
maintain, and protect his easement or right way[.]'" Id. at 702 (citations and quotations 
omitted). Additionally, the Court announced that '"[o]ne acquiring an easement and right 
to travel over the lands of another not only assumes the burden of maintenance of said 
right of way, but all other burdens incident to the use."' Id (citations omitted). 
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Significantly, the Neilson Court also affirmed that "[t]he landowner is not liable for 
damages caused by ordinary use of the land by him." Id. 
Because NFSSD was granted an easement by Judge Schofield, Utah law 
prescribes a legal duty upon NFSSD to maintain its easement. The evidence provided to 
the trial court clearly demonstrates that from September 26, 2006 through October 2007, 
NFSSD failed to maintain its easement, and that NFSSD was awarded over $41,728.14 in 
water overuse charges against Mr. Bennion. Those charges are the direct result of 
NFSSD's failure to maintain its easement. 
The evidence placed before the trial court shows that the extensive water overuse 
charges demanded by NFSSD pertain only to leaks in Mr. Bennion's waterline. The trial 
court was notified that in 1998 Mr. Bennion shut off the water to his Property, and did 
not use the water after that point. Further, the trial court had before it Judge Schofield's 
September 26, 2006 Ruling finding that Mr. Bennion's "pipe is leaking and losing 
hundreds of gallons of water each week." R. 103. That Ruling also established an 
easement of immediate occupancy in favor of NFSSD for the purpose of stopping and 
repairing the leaks, which easement was effective as of the date of the Ruling on 
September 26, 2006. 
The date of NFSSD's grant of easement falls squarely within the period of time for 
which NFSSD was seeking to collect water overuse fees from Mr. Bennion in the instant 
case. According to the invoices NFSSD provided to the court the water overuse charges 
ceased in October 2007, signaling to the court that this was the date that NFSSD actually 
27 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
made its repairs to Mr. Bennion's lateral waterline. Accordingly, from September 26, 
2006 to October 2007, NFSSD permitted the lateral waterline to leak, and despite its legal 
duty to maintain its easement and its representation to Judge Schofield that it would 
immediately make the requisite repairs to stop the leaks, NFSSD charged Mr. Bennion 
$41,728.14 plus interest for the water that leaked from the Property's lateral waterline. 
In light of that substantial evidence and of longstanding Utah law requiring 
NFSSD to maintain its easement, the trial court erred in finding that Mr. Bennion was 
responsible to maintain and repair the leaks in the Property's lateral waterline, and in 
requiring Mr. Bennion to pay water overuse charges related to those leaks. Where the 
facts and law do not support the trial court's summary judgment, the court's ruling in that 
matter should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
POINT HI 
BECAUSE MR BENNION'S DEFENSES ARE MERITORIOUS, THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 
NFSSD UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-825, 
In addition to damages for water overuse fees and interest, the trial court also 
awarded NFSSD attorney's fees in the amount of $11,362.50. The court's award was 
based on its finding that Mr. Bennion committed bad faith in litigation under UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78B-5-825. Where Mr. Bennion's defenses are meritorious, the trial court erred 
in awarding attorney's fees to NFSSD pursuant to Section 78B-5-825. 
Section 78B-5-825 provides for an award of attorney fees to a plaintiff if the 
defendant's defense was both (1) "without merit" and (2) "not brought or asserted in 
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good faith." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-825 (2008). c;[W]hether a claim is 'without 
merit' is a question of law [an appellate court] review[s] for correctness." In re Olympus 
Constr., L.C., 2009 UT 29, \ 8. Where an appellate court finds as a matter of law that a 
party's claim has merit, it need not reach the second, factual "bad faith" element of 
Section 78B-5-825. Id. at n. 1. In determining whether there is merit to a claim, an 
appellate court focuses on whether the claim was "'frivolous'" or "cof little weight or 
importance having no basis in law or fact.'" Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, f 
22, 20 P.3d 868 (quoting Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). 
The arguments specified in Points I and II above demonstrate that Mr. Bennion's 
defenses to NFSSD's motion for summary judgment were not frivolous and have a 
legitimate basis in law and fact. In the trial court, Mr. Bennion asserted that NFSSD's 
service fees and interest damages for the period of May 3, 2004 through April 30, 2007 
must be reduced to $200 per month pursuant to the applicable requirements of Sections 
17B-2-804 and 17A-1-205, which were in effect at that time. Similarly, Mr. Bennion 
also argued that Sections 17B-1-904 and 17D-1-106, which limit the interest charges in 
this case from May 8, 2008 to the present to the amount of $200 per month, constitute 
binding law. Lastly, in light of NFSSD's easement previously awarded by Judge 
Schofield, Mr. Bennion argued to the trial court that NFSSD should be responsible to 
maintain its easement by repairing and/or replacing the Property's leaking lateral 
waterline. In its decisions, the trial court overlooked each of these arguments. 
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As is demonstrated above, Mr. Bennion's arguments are clearly based in sound 
fact and law, and therefore, are not frivolous. Furthermore, these arguments are weighty 
in that they stand to save Mr. Bennion approximately $150,000.00 in service fees and 
interest. Because Mr. Bennion's claims have merit, the trial court erred in awarding 
NFSSD $11,362.50 in attorney's fees pursuant to Section 78B-5-825. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Bennion respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court's summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this /p-d&y of March 2012. 
WRONA LAW FIRM, P.C. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 2004 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis 
Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** ARCHIVE DATA*** 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2004 FOURTH SPECIAL SESSION *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2005 UT 7, 2005 UT APP 37 *** 
* * * AND JANUARY 27, 2005 (FEDERAL CASES) * * * 
TITLE 17A. SPECIAL DISTRICTS 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
PART 2. COMPLIANCE WITH OTHER ACTS 
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-1-205 (2004) 
§ 17A-1-205. Special districts subject to local district provisions relating to collection of 
water and sewer service fees 
Each special district under this title is subject to the provisions of Title 17B, Chapter 2, 
Part 8, Collection of Water and Sewer Service Fees, to the same extent as if the special 
district were a local district under Title 17B, Chapter 2, Local Districts. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 17A-1-205, enacted by L. 2004, ch. 316, § 3. 
NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 2004, ch. 316 became effective on May 3, 2004, 
pursuant to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2007 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis 
Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** ARCHIVE DATA *** 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2007 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION *** 
* * * AND THE NOVEMBER 2007 ELECTION * * * 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2008 UT 5 (2/1/2008); 2008 UT APP 43 
*** (2/14/2008) AND JANUARY 1, 2008 (FEDERAL CASES) *** 
TITLE 17A. LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED DISTRICTS 
CHAPTER 2. INDEPENDENT DISTRICTS 
PART 13. SPECIAL SERVICE DISTRICTS 
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1320 (2007) ' 
§ 17A-2-1320. Fees or charges — Penalties for delinquencies 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3), the governing authority of a service district 
may enact a resolution or ordinance that imposes fees or charges for any commodities, 
services, or facilities provided by the service district. 
i 
(b) (i) The governing authority may collect those fees or charges, and may pledge all or 
part of the revenues from those fees and charges to the payment of any bonds issued by 
the service district, whether the bonds are issued as revenue bonds, guaranteed bonds, or 
as general obligations of the district. 
(ii) When revenue bonds are issued payable solely from the fees and charges authorized 
by this subsection, the fees and charges shall be sufficient to carry out any provisions of 
the resolution or ordinance authorizing the issuance of the revenue bonds, including 
provisions for payment of the principal of and interest on the bonds, the operation and 
maintenance of the facilities, and the establishment and maintenance of appropriate 
reserve funds while these bonds are outstanding. 
(2) (a) The governing authority may adopt rules to assure the proper collection and 
enforcement of all fees and charges imposed by this section. 
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(b) (i) The governing authority may assess and collect penalties and interest if the fees 
and charges are not paid when due. 
(ii) Any penalty or interest on delinquent charges assessed under the authority of this 
subsection shall be the same as applied to delinquent real property taxes for the year in 
which the fee or charge became delinquent. 
(c) When more than one commodity, service, or facility is furnished by the district, the 
fees and charges for all commodities, services, and facilities may be billed to the user in a 
single bill. 
(d) All or any of the commodities, services, and facilities furnished to a user by the 
service district may be suspended if any fees or charges due the service district are not 
paid in full when due. 
(3) A special service district that provides jail service as provided in Subsection 17A-2-
1304(l)(a)(x) may not impose any fee or charge under this section for the service it 
provides. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 11-23-19, enacted by L. 1975, ch. 116, § 19; 1988, ch. 19, § 1; 
renumbered by L. 1990, ch. 186, § 655; 2001, ch. 195, § 3. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, 
added the exception at the beginning of the section and added Subsection (3). 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2007 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis 
Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** ARCHIVE DATA*** 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2007 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION *** 
* * * AND THE NOVEMBER 2007 ELECTION * * * 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2008 UT 5 (2/1/2008); 2008 UT APP 43 
n» *!• H* 
*** (2/14/2008) AND JANUARY 1, 2008 (FEDERAL CASES) *** 
TITLE 17B. LIMITED PURPOSE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENTITIES -- LOCAL 
DISTRICTS 
CHAPTER 1. PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL LOCAL DISTRICTS 
PART 9. COLLECTION OF SERVICE FEES AND CHARGES 
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-1-904 (2007) 
§ 17B-1-904. Collection of service fees 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Collection costs" means an amount, not to exceed $ 20, to reimburse a local district 
for expenses associated with its efforts to collect past due service fees from a customer. 
(b) "Customer" means the owner of real property to which a local district has provided a 
service for which the local district charges a service fee. 
(c) "Damages" means an amount equal to the greater of: 
(i)$ 100; and 
(ii) triple the past due service fees. 
(d) "Default date" means the date on which payment for service fees becomes past due. 
(e) "Past due service fees" means service fees that on or after the default date have not 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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been paid. 
(f) "Prelitigation damages" means an amount that is equal to the greater of: 
(i)$50;and 
(ii) triple the past due service fees. 
(g) "Service fee" means an amount charged by a local district to a customer for a service, 
including furnishing water, providing sewer service, and providing garbage collection 
service, that the district provides to the customer's property. 
(2) A customer is liable to a local district for past due service fees and collection costs if: 
(a) the customer has not paid service fees before the default date; 
(b) the local district mails the customer notice as provided in Subsection (4); and 
(c) the past due service fees remain unpaid 15 days after the local district has mailed 
notice. 
(3) If a customer has not paid the local district the past due service fees and collection 
costs within 30 days after the local district mails notice, the local district may make an 
offer to the customer that the local district will forego filing a civil action under 
Subsection (5) if the customer pays the local district an amount that: 
(a) consists of the past due service fees, collection costs, prelitigation damages, and, if the 
local district retains an attorney to recover the past due service fees, a reasonable attorney 
fee not to exceed $ 50; and 
(b) if the customer's property is residential, may not exceed $ 100. 
(4) (a) Each notice under Subsection (2)(b) shall: 
(i) be in writing; 
(ii) be mailed to the customer by the United States mail, postage prepaid; 
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(iii) notify the customer that: 
(A) if the past due service fees are not paid within 15 days after the day on which the 
local district mailed notice, the customer is liable for the past due service fees and 
collection costs; and 
(B) the local district may file civil action if the customer does not pay to the local district 
the past due service fees and collection costs within 30 calendar days from the day on 
which the local district mailed notice; and 
(iv) be in substantially the following form: 
Date: 
To: 
Service address: 
Account or invoice number(s): 
Date(s) of service: 
Amount past due: 
You are hereby notified that water or sewer service fees (or both) owed by you are in 
default. In accordance with Section 17B-1-902, Utah Code Annotated, if you do not pay 
the past due amount within 15 days from the day on which this notice was mailed to you, ( 
you are liable for the past due amount together with collection costs of $ 20. 
You are further notified that if you do not pay the past due amount and the $ 20 collection 
costs within 30 calendar days from the day on which this notice was mailed to you, an < 
appropriate civil legal action may be filed aigainst you for the past due amount, interest, 
court costs, attorney fees, and damages in an amount equal to the greater of $ 100 or 
triple the past due amounts, but the combined total of all these amounts may not exceed $ 
200 if your property is residential. < 
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(Signed) 
Name of local district 
Address of local district 
Telephone number of local district 
(b) Written notice under this section is conclusively presumed to have been given if the 
notice is: 
(i) properly deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, by certified or registered 
mail, return receipt requested; and 
(ii) addressed to the customer at the customer's: 
(A) address as it appears in the records of the local district; or 
(B) last-known address. 
(5) (a) A local district may file a civil action against the customer if the customer fails to 
pay the past due service fees and collection costs within 30 calendar days from the date 
on which the local district mailed notice under Subsection (2)(b). 
(b) (i) In a civil action under this Subsection (5), a customer is liable to the local district 
for an amount that: 
(A) consists of past due service fees, collection costs, interest, court costs, a reasonable 
attorney fee, and damages; and 
(B) if the customer's property is residential, may not exceed $ 200. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(b)(i), a court may, upon a finding of good cause, 
waive interest, court costs, the attorney fee, and damages, or any combination of them. 
(c) If a local district files a civil action under this Subsection (5) before 31 calendar days 
after the day on which the local district mailed notice under Subsection (2)(b), a customer 
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may not be held liable for an amount in excess of past due service fees. 
(d) A local district may not file a civil action under this Subsection (5) unless the 
customer has failed to pay the past due sendee fees and collection costs within 30 days 
from the day on which the local district mailed notice under Subsection (2)(b)„ 
(6) (a) All amounts charged or collected as prelitigation damages or as damages shall be 
paid to and be the property of the local district that furnished water or provided sewer 
service and may not be retained by a person who is not that local district. 
(b) A local district may not contract for a person to retain any amounts charged or 
collected as prelitigation damages or as damages. 
(7) This section may not be construed to limit a local district from obtaining relief to 
which it may be entitled under other applicable statute or cause of action. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 17B-2-801, enacted by L. 2004, ch. 316, § 7; renumbered by L. 
2007, ch. 329, §243. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2007 amendment, effective April 30, 2007, 
renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 17B-2-801; added Subsections (2) 
through (7) and made related changes; substituted "section" for "part" in the introductory 
language of Subsection (1); substituted "provided a service for which the local district 
charges a service fee" for "furnished water or provided sewer service" in Subsection 
(l)(b); and rewrote Subsection (l)(g) to expand the definition of "service fee." 
EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 2004, ch. 316 became effective on May 3, 2004, pursuant 
to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2012 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis 
Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2011 THIRD SPECIAL SESSION. *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2011 UT 70 (11/08/2011); 2011 UT APP 
390 (11/10/2011) AND NOVEMBER 1, 2011 (FEDERAL CASES). *** 
TITLE 17B. LIMITED PURPOSE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENTITIES - LOCAL 
DISTRICTS 
CHAPTER 1. PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL LOCAL DISTRICTS 
PART 9. COLLECTION OF SERVICE FEES AND CHARGES 
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-1-904 (2012) 
§ 17B-1-904. Collection of service fees 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Collection costs" means an amount, not to exceed $ 20, to reimburse a local district 
for expenses associated with its efforts to collect past due service fees from a customer. 
(b) "Customer" means the owner of real property to which a local district has provided a 
service for which the local district charges a service fee. 
(c) "Damages" means an amount equal to the greater of: 
(i)$ 100;and 
(ii) triple the past due service fees. 
(d) "Default date" means the date on which payment for service fees becomes past due. 
(e) "Past due service fees" means service fees that on or after the default date have not 
been paid. 
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(f) "Prelitigation damages" means an amount that is equal to the greater of: 
(i)$50;and 
(ii) triple the past due service fees. 
(g) "Service fee" means an amount charged by a local district to a customer for a service, 
including furnishing water, providing sewer service, and providing garbage collection 
service, that the district provides to the customer's property. 
(2) A customer is liable to a local district for past due service fees and collection costs if: 
(a) the customer has not paid service fees before the default date; 
(b) the local district mails the customer notice as provided in Subsection (4); and 
(c) the past due service fees remain unpaid 15 days after the local district has mailed 
notice. 
(3) If a customer has not paid the local district the past due service fees and collection 
costs within 30 days after the local district mails notice, the local district may make an 
offer to the customer that the local district will forego filing a civil action under 
Subsection (5) if the customer pays the local district an amount that: 
(a) consists of the past due service fees, collection costs, prelitigation damages, and, if the 
local district retains an attorney to recover the past due service fees, a reasonable attorney 
fee not to exceed $ 50; and 
i 
(b) if the customer's property is residential, may not exceed $ 100. 
(4) (a) Each notice under Subsection (2)(b) shall: 
1 
(i) be in writing; 
(ii) be mailed to the customer by the United States mail, postage prepaid; 
(iii) notify the customer that: 
< 
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(A) if the past due service fees are not paid within 15 days after the day on which the 
local district mailed notice, the customer is liable for the past due service fees and 
collection costs; and 
(B) the local district may file civil action if the customer does not pay to the local district 
the past due service fees and collection costs within 30 calendar days from the day on 
which the local district mailed notice; and 
(iv) be in substantially the following form: 
Date: 
To: 
Service address: 
Account or invoice number(s): 
Date(s) of service: 
Amount past due: 
You are hereby notified that water or sewer service fees (or both) owed by you are in 
default. In accordance with Section 17B-1-902, Utah Code Annotated, if you do not pay 
the past due amount within 15 days from the day on which this notice was mailed to you, 
you are liable for the past due amount together with collection costs of $ 20. 
You are further notified that if you do not pay the past due amount and the $ 20 collection 
costs within 30 calendar days from the day on which this notice was mailed to you, an 
appropriate civil legal action may be filed against you for the past due amount, interest, 
court costs, attorney fees, and damages in an amount equal to the greater of $ 100 or 
triple the past due amounts, but the combined total of all these amounts may not exceed $ 
200 if your property is residential. 
(Signed) 
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Name of local district 
Address of local district 
Telephone number of local district 
(b) Written notice under this section is conclusively presumed to have been given if the 
notice is: 
(i) properly deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, by certified or registered 
mail, return receipt requested; and 
(ii) addressed to the customer at the customer's: 
(A) address as it appears in the records of the local district; or 
(B) last-known address. 
(5) (a) A local district may file a civil action against the customer if the customer fails to 
pay the past due service fees and collection costs within 30 calendar days from the date 
on which the local district mailed notice under Subsection (2)(b). 
(b) (i) In a civil action under this Subsection (5), a customer is liable to the local district 
for an amount that: 
(A) consists of past due service fees, collection costs, interest, court costs, a reasonable 
attorney fee, and damages: and 
(B) if the customer's property is residential, may not exceed $ 200. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(b)(i), a court may, upon a finding of good cause, 
waive interest, court costs, the attorney fee, and damages, or any combination of them. 
(c) If a local district files a civil action under this Subsection (5) before 31 calendar days 
after the day on which the local district mailed notice under Subsection (2)(b), a customer 
may not be held liable for an amount in excess of past due service fees. 
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(d) A local district may not file a civil action under this Subsection (5) unless the 
customer has failed to pay the past due service fees and collection costs within 30 days 
from the day on which the local district mailed notice under Subsection (2)(b). 
(6) (a) All amounts charged or collected as prelitigation damages or as damages shall be 
paid to and be the property of the local district that furnished water or provided sewer 
service and may not be retained by a person who is not that local district. 
(b) A local district may not contract for a person to retain any amounts charged or 
collected as prelitigation damages or as damages. 
(7) This section may not be construed to limit a local district from obtaining relief to 
which it may be entitled under other applicable statute or cause of action. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 17B-2-801, enacted by L. 2004, ch. 316, § 7; renumbered by L. 
2007, ch. 329, §243. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2007 amendment, effective April 30, 2007, 
renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 17B-2-801; added Subsections (2) 
through (7) and made related changes; substituted "section" for "part" in the introductory 
language of Subsection (1); substituted "provided a service for which the local district 
charges a service fee" for "furnished water or provided sewer service" in Subsection 
(l)(b); and rewrote Subsection (l)(g) to expand the definition of "service fee." 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 2004 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis 
Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** ARCHIVE DATA *** 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2004 FOURTH SPECIAL SESSION *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2005 UT 7, 2005 UT APP 37 *** 
* * * AND JANUARY 27, 2005 (FEDERAL CASES) * * * 
TITLE 17B. LIMITED PURPOSE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENTITIES 
CHAPTER 2. LOCAL DISTRICTS 
PART 8. COLLECTION OF WATER AND SEWER SERVICE FEES 
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 (2004) 
§ 17B-2-804. Collection of past due fees for water or sewer service — Civil action 
authorized 
(1) A customer is liable to a local district for past due service fees and collection costs if: 
(a) the customer has not paid service fees before the default date; 
(b) the local district mails the customer notice as provided in Section 17B-2-805; and 
(c) the past due service fees remain unpaid 15 days after the local district has mailed 
notice. 
(2) If a customer has not paid the local district the past due sendee fees and collection 
costs within 30 days after the local district mails notice, the local district may make an 
offer to the customer that the local district will forego filing a civil action under 
Subsection (3) if the customer pays the local district an amount that: 
(a) consists of the past due service fees, collection costs, prelitigation damages., and, if the 
local district retains an attorney to recover the past due service fees, a reasonable 
attorney's fee not to exceed $ 50; and 
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(b) if the customer's property is residential, may not exceed $ 100. 
(3) (a) A local district may file a civil action against the customer if the customer fails to 
pay the past due service fees and collection costs within 30 calendar days from the date 
on which the local district mailed notice under Subsection (l)(b). 
(b) (i) In a civil action under this Subsection (3), a customer is liable to the local district 
for an amount that: 
(A) consists of past due service fees, collection costs, interest, court costs, a reasonable 
attorney's fee, and damages; and 
(B) if the customer's property is residential, may not exceed $ 200. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b)(i), a court may, upon a finding of good cause, 
waive interest, court costs, the attorney's fee, and damages, or any combination of them. 
(c) If a local district files a civil action under this Subsection (3) before 31 calendar days 
after the day on which the local district mailed notice under Subsection (l)(b), a customer 
may not be held liable for an amount in excess of past due service fees. 
(d) A local district may not file a civil action under this Subsection (3) unless the 
customer has failed to pay the past due service fees and collection costs within 30 days 
from the day on which the local district mailed notice under Subsection (l)(b). 
(4) (a) All amounts charged or collected as prelitigation damages or as damages shall be 
paid to and be the property of the local district that furnished water or provided sewer 
service and may not be retained by a person who is not that local district. 
(b) A local district may not contract for a person to retain any amounts charged or 
collected as prelitigation damages or as damages. 
(5) This chapter may not be construed to limit a local district that furnishes water or 
provides sewer service from obtaining relief to which it may be entitled under other 
applicable statute or cause of action. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 17B-2-804, enacted by L. 2004, ch. 316, § 10. 
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NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 2004, ch. 316 became effective on May 3, 2004, 
pursuant to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2012 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis 
Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2011 THIRD SPECIAL SESSION. *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2011 UT 70 (11/08/2011); 2011 UT APP 
390 (11/10/2011) AND NOVEMBER 1, 2011 (FEDERAL CASES). *** 
TITLE 17D. LIMITED PURPOSE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENTITIES - OTHER 
ENTITIES 
CHAPTER 1. SPECIAL SERVICE DISTRICT ACT 
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 17D-1-106 (2012) 
§ 17D-1-106. Special service districts subject to other provisions 
(1) A special service district is, to the same extent as if it were a local district, subject to 
and governed by: 
(a) Sections 17B-1-105, 17B-1-107, 17B-1-108, 17B-1-109, 17B-1-110, 17B-1-111, 17B-
1-112, 17B-1-113, 17B-1-116, 17B-1-118, 17B-1-119, 17B-1-120, and 17B-1-121; 
(b) Subsections 17B-1-301(3) and (4), Sections 17B-1-304, 17B-1-305, 17B-1-306, 17B-
1-307, 17B-1-310, 17B-1-312, 17B-1-313, and 17B-1-314; 
(c) Section 20A-1-512; 
(d) Title 17B, Chapter 1, Part 6, Fiscal Procedures for Local Districts; 
(e) Title 17B, Chapter 1, Part 7, Local District Budgets and Audit Reports; 
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(f) Title 17B, Chapter 1, Part 8, Local District Personnel Management; and 
(g) Title 17B, Chapter 1, Part 9, Collection of Service Fees and Charges. 
(2) For purposes of applying the provisions listed in Subsection (1) to a special service 
district, each reference in those provisions to the local district board of trustees means the 
governing body. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 17D-1-106, enacted by L. 2008, ch. 360, § 54; 2009, ch. 181, § 16; 
2009, ch. 356, § 6; 2011, ch. 40, § 4; 2011, ch. 106, § 8; 2011, ch. 205, § 5; 2011, ch. 
209, §10. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2009 amendment by ch. 181, effective May 12, 
2009, added "17B-1-118" in the sections list of (l)(a) and made related changes. 
The 2009 amendment by ch. 356, effective May 12, 2009, substituted "governing body" 
for "governing authority" in (2). 
The 2011 amendment by ch. 40, effective May 10, 2011, added § 20A-1-512 to the list in 
(1) and made related designation changes. 
The 2011 amendment by ch. 106, effective May 10, 2011, added "and 17B-1-314" in 
(l)(b) and made a related change. 
The 2011 amendment by ch. 205, effective May 10, 2011, added §§ 17B-1-119, 17B-1-
120, and 17B-1-121 to the list of sections in (l)(a). 
The 2011 amendment by ch. 209, effective May 10, 2011, added "Subsections 17B-1-
' 301(3)and(4)"in(l)(b). 
This section has been reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Laws 2008, ch. 360 became effective on May 5, 2008, pursuant to Utah Const., Art. VI, 
Sec. 25. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2012 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis 
Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2011 THIRD SPECIAL SESSION. *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2011 UT 70 (11/08/2011); 2011 UT APP 
390 (11/10/2011) AND NOVEMBER 1, 2011 (FEDERAL CASES). *** 
TITLE 78B. JUDICIAL CODE 
CHAPTER 5. PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 
PART 8. MISCELLANEOUS 
Utah Code Ana. § 78B-5-825 (2012) 
§ 78B-5-825. Attorney fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith — Exceptions 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if 
the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under 
Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the provisions of 
Subsection (1). 
HISTORY: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1; 1988, ch. 92, § 1; renumbered by L. 2008, ch. 3, § 857. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2008 amendment, effective February 7, 2008, 
renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 78-27-56, and made a stylistic 
change. 
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UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 2011 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 
a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All Rights Reserved 
*** Current through rules effective as of December 1,2011*** 
STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VII. JUDGMENT 
URCP Rule 56 (2011) 
Rule 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant. -- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim 
or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from 
the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by 
the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. -- A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary 
judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. — The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there 
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. - If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court 
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and 
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
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relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and 
the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. — Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may 
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file 
such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. -- Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to 
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. -- If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith 
order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable 
expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, 
and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
HISTORY: Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004 
NOTES: Compiler's Notes. -- This rule is similar to Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
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Kasey L. Wright, Bar No. 9169 
Melissa K. Mellor, Bar No. 10437 
HANSEN WRIGHT EDDY & HAWS, P.C. 
233 South Pleasant Grove Blvd., Ste. 202 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801)443-2380 
Facsimile: (801) 796-0984 
e-mail: mmellor@centralutahlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
NORTH FORK SPECIAL SERVICE 
DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT BENNION, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 080400633 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
On June 8, 2011, the Court considered heard argument on Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment. At the hearing, Plaintiff was represented by its attorney, Melissa K. Mellor, 
of HANSEN WRIGHT EDDY & HAWS, P.C, and Defendant was pro se. 
After hearing arguments, reviewing the pleadings on file and evidence presented, this 
Court issues the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is a special service district duly organized and authorized pursuant to Utah 
State Law. See Utah Code Ann. § 17B-1-115. (Plaintifforiginally organized pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 17A-2-1314 and 17A-2-1320). 
2. Plaintiff provides water services, garbage collection services, and fire protection 
services to properties located within its boundaries,. All property owners located within the special 
service district's boundaries are required to pay a monthly base fee for the services. 
3. Plaintiffs Board has also established additional fees and penalties if a North Fork 
member fails to timely pay the fees established and imposed by Plaintiff, e.g. interest at the rate of 
12% per annum on delinquent accounts. 
4. Plaintiff is authorized to charge an excess water usage fee to the members who use 
more than 5,000 gallons during one month. The amount Plaintiff charges North Fork members for 
excess water usage is based on a graduated scale adopted by Plaintiff s Board. 
5. At all times relevant to this action, Bennion owned certain real'property located 
within the boundaries of North Fork previously identified herein as "the Bennion property" or 
"Bennion's property." 
6. Plaintiff has continuously provided the Bennion property with water, garbage 
collection, and fire protection services for several years, including at all times relevant to this case. 
2 
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7. Pursuant to Plaintiff s Motion for Summary- Judgment, Plaintiff sought payment for 
services provided from February 29, 2004 through March 31, 2009. 
8. Plaintiff customarily and routinely sent invoice statements on a quarterly basis to 
Bennion during all times relevant to this action. 
9. Bennion never voluntarily paid for services provided by Plaintiff. 
10. The only payments for services Plaintiff has received on Bennion's account came 
from extensive litigation and release of a bond previously posted with this Court by Bennion in 
another action. 
11. Bennion is delinquent in paying his monthly base fee for access to water, fire 
protection, and sanitation services provided by Plaintiff from February 29,2004 through March 31, 
2009 in the amount of Three Thousand Seven Hundred Eleven Dollars ($3,711.00). 
12. An account for service fees is considered delinquent when it remains unpaid more 
than 30 days after the statement date. 
13. Plaintiff is responsible for the maintenance of the main water lines of its water 
delivery system. 
14. Plaintiff is not responsible for maintenance of lateral water lines that connect to the 
main water lines of Plaintiffs water delivery system. Rather, individual property owners are 
responsible for the maintenance of lateral water lines servicing their properties. 
15. Prior to November 1997 through March 31,2009, Bennion has been the owner of the 
lateral water line from the point it connects to the Plaintiffs main water line at a meter box located 
3 
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north of the Bennion property to the meter box south of the Bennion property that is located on a 
property adjacent to the Bennion property (hereinafter referred to as "the Bennion Lateral Water 
L i n e
" ) . 
16. Bennion is responsible for water taken out of the Bennion Lateral Water Line 
regardless of whether or not he personally utilizes the water. 
17. Bennion refused to allow Plaintiffs representatives on the Bennion property to fix 
and service the Bennion Lateral Water Line. 
18. The leaks that may have contributed to the excess water usage through the Bennion 
Lateral Water Line were remedied only after Plaintiff obtained injunctive relief to enter the Bennion 
property to fix and service the water delivery system. 
19. Between February 28, 2004 and March 31,2009, approximately 14,700,268 gallons 
of water were taken out of Plaintiff s water system by way of the Bennion Lateral Water Line. This 
is based on meter readings taken between the between the two points of the Bennion Lateral Water 
Line. 
20. The charges for Bennion's excess water usage from February 28,2004 through March 
31, 2009, totals Ninety Five Thousand Three Hundred Thirty and 38/100 Dollars ($95,330.38). 
21. Bennion is delinquent in paying for the excess water usage through the Bennion 
Lateral Water Line. 
22. The amount of interest (pursuant to a rate of 12% per annum) based on each 
delinquent charge added to Bennion's account totals Sixty One Thousand One Hundred Fifty-Five 
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and 22/100 Dollars ($61,155.22) from April 30, 2004 (date the charges in question on the account 
first became delinquent) through June 8, 2011. 
23. Bennion's actions and continued litigation have been pursued in bad faith, resulting in 
Plaintiff incurring extensive legal fees to pursue its legal rights. 
24. As set forth in Plaintiff s Affidavit of Attorney Fees, Plaintiff incurred attorney fees in 
the amount of Eleven Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Two and 50/100 Dollars ($11,362.50). The 
Court finds such fees to be reasonable. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Bennion is the owner of the Bennion Lateral Water Line. 
2. Bennion is responsible for the maintenance, including repair of leaks, of the 
Bennion Lateral Water Line. 
3. Bennion is obligated to pay Plaintiff the established fee for the garbage, water, 
and fire protection services that Plaintiff provided to Bennion between February 28, 2004 and 
March 31, 2009. 
4. Bennion owes Plaintiff the sum of Three Thousand Seven Hundred Eleven 
Dollars ($3,711.00) for base user fees between February 28, 2004 and March 31, 2009. 
5. Bennion owes Plaintiff the sum of Ninety Five Thousand Three Hundred Thirty 
and 38/100 Dollars ($95,330.38) for excess water usage fees between February 28, 2004 and 
March 31, 2009. 
6. Plaintiff is entitled to interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, from 
5 
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April 30, 2004 through June 8, 2011, for a total interest amount of Sixty One Thousand One 
Hundred Fifty-Five and 22/100 Dollars ($61,155.22). 
7. Plaintiff is entitled to continumg interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per 
annum until the judgment is paid in full. 
8. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78B-5-825, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of 
attorney fees against Bennion in the amount of Eleven Thousand Tliree Hundred Sixty-Two and 
50/100 Dollars ($11,362.50). 
DATED this / ^ d a y o f dCA-i >2 0 1 1-
BY THE COURT: 
0P,\GlfsU£ 
v 
Approved as to form: 
. ^ ^NSENJ J ~ 
Fourth Judicial District GbXa$s&+/. 
ROBERT F. BENNION 
Defendant, Pro Se 
nnruns 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, postage prepaid by first-class mail, on this / ^Te l ay of October, 2011, to the 
following: 
Robert F. Bennion 
3220 Mariner Bay Street 
Las Vegas, NV 89117 
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE 
To: Robert F. Bennion 
3220 Mariner Bay Street 
LasVegas,NV 89117 
Re: North Fork Special Service District v. Robert Bennion. 
Case No. 080400633 
Please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Plaintiff will submit the above and 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for 
Utah County, Utah for signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this notice, 
plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time pursuant to 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this ^ C i a y of October, 2011. 
HANSEN WRIGHT EDDY & HAWS, P.C. 
MELISSA K.MELLOR 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
r\ r\ w . 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ' Y 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NORTH FORK SPECIAL SERVICE 
DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT BENNION, 
Defendant. 
L 
'CASENUMBER: 060401631 
DATED: SEPTEMBER 22,2006 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
This case comes before the court on the motion of the North Fork Special Service District 
(the "District") for an order of immediate occupancy. Having read the memoranda, heard oral 
arguments of counsel, and having reviewed the evidence submitted by affidavit, I grant the 
motion. 
BACKGROUND 
Currently there is a water pipe that crosses Defendant Robert Bennion's ("Bennion") 
property and provides water to several users. This pipe is leaking and losing hundreds of gallons 
of water each week. The District desires to condemn an easement across Bennion's property to 
install a new water line to better serve the users on the other side of Bennion's property. The 
District has moved for an order of immediate occupancy to repair the existing pipe and begin 
preliminary work to install a new water line while the condemnation action is pending. 
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Bennion opposes this motion, claiming that the District is not likely to eventually obtain 
the proposed easement and that the reasons for requesting a speedy occupancy are without merit. 
Bennion also claims that the order of immediate occupancy should not be granted until the 
District has paid for past use of Bennion's water pipe. 
ANALYSIS 
As a special service district in Utah, the District has the power of eminent domain. Utah 
Code Ann. § 17A-2-1314(l)(b). The use of eminent domain to provide water to persons is 
specifically authorized by statute in Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-1(5). 
The question of whether to grant an. order of immediate occupancy is controlled by Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-34-9. The court is required to "take proof by affidavit or otherwise of: (i) the 
value of the premises sought to be condemned; (ii) the damages that will accrue from the 
condemnation; and (iii) the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation." Id. at § 78-34-9(2). The 
court should "grant or refuse the motion according to the equity of the case and the relative 
damages that may accrue to the parties." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted the predecessor of this statute to require that 
"the [condemning authority] has the burden of coming forward with the evidence of, and the 
burden of persuasion to establish its right to condemn." Utah State Road Commission v. Friberg, 
687?2d 821, 832 (Utah 1984) (citing Tanner v. Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 
105,118 (1911), aff'd, 239 U.S. 323 (1915)). The [condemning authority] is required to provide 
a "prima facie showing as to [its] right to condemn." Id. at 833. 
I first address the argument by Bennion that the motion should not be granted because the 
District is not likely to obtain the proposed easement. Bennion argues that the District cannot 
exercise the power of eminent domain to effectively make a gift to a private developer. Bennion 
2 * 
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cites a Utah Supreme Court case requiring that public property "not be disposed of other than 'in 
good faith for adequate consideration.'" Mem. in Opp 'n to Pi's Mot for Order of Immediate 
Occupancy 10 (citing Price Development Co. v. Orem City, 995 P.2d 1237, 1247 (Utah 2000) 
(quoting Sears v. Ogden City, 533 P.2d 118, 119 (Utah 1975), affdon rehearing, 537P.2d 1029 
(Utah 1975)). Bennion's argument fails for two reasons. 
First, the proposed easement is not being sought for the purpose of benefitting a private 
developer. Rather, the District is condemning this easement to provide water to several existing 
and proposed home sites within its service area, an authorized use which falls within the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-1(5). Second, the District is not providing a gift to 
anyone in this instance. The District has a duty to provide water service to all home sites within 
its service area, which is what it seeks to do in this case. Further, it is paying fair consideration 
for the easement which it is acquiring. There simply is no clear evidence that the purpose being 
sought by the District is improper in any way. 
I turn next to Bennion's argument that the motion should not be granted because there is 
no need for a speedy occupation. The current pipe is leaking and losing hundreds of gallons of 
water each week. At oral argument, the District stated that it was not planning to repair the 
existing pipe, but rather that it planned to install a new water line. The District admitted in oral 
arguments that it was uncertain whether a new pipe could be installed before winter. It asserted, 
however, that there is preliminary work that needs to be done immediately. 
Bennion suggested several other alternatives in its memorandum, but offered no evidence 
to suggest that a less intrusive method was available. Whether the District in fact begins 
construction immediately or simply uses the Order of Immediate Occupancy to begin preliminary 
work on the property is within the District's discretion. In my judgment, however, and based 
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upon the evidence presented by affidavit, granting this motion will best serve the purposes of 
halting the loss of water and providing water to both existing and future home sites in the 
District's service area. 
Finally, I turn to the argument that the motion should not be granted until the District has 
compensated Bennion for its past use of his water pipe. This argument is barred by res judicata, 
Bennion raised the issue in a prior action and lost, 4th District Case # 040401235. 
The District's motion for an Order of Immediate Occupancy is granted. 
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the District's counsel is directed 
to prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this *2Z day of September, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
ANTHONt W. SCHOfrELD, JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this $>y day of September, 2006: 
Kasey L. Wright 
Attorney for The District 
388 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Claire Summerhill 
Attorney for Bennion 
109 E. South Temple, Suite 3-E 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
LORIWOFFINDEN 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
By Jtf_ InAXmMMM 
)epkty Clerk 
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